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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS

ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS
SECTION 9-103. Accounts, Contract Rights, General Intangibles
and Equipment Relating to Another
Jurisdiction; and Incoming Goods Already
Subject to a Security Interest

AL MAROONE FORD, INC. V. MANHEIM AUTO AUCTION, INC.
208 A.2d 290 (Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-201, supra.
SECTION 9-104. Transactions Excluded from Article

IN RE KING FURNITURE CITY, INC.
240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965)
On March 21, 1963, the petitioner leased certain premises to King Furniture. The lease provided, in part, that "to secure the payment of all rent
due . , Tenant hereby gives the Landlord an express contract lien on all
property, chattels or merchandise which may be placed in the leased premises." Neither the original lease nor a memorandum lease was recorded pursuant to Section 9-401 of the Arkansas Code, but a memorandum lease was
filed pursuant to a realty recording statute. On June 10, 1964, the petitioner
brought suit in the chancery court to foreclose his lien under the lease, alleging
that King Furniture had not paid its rent. The chancery court decreed that the
merchandise on the leased premises was to be marked as subject to the lien,
and sold in the ordinary course of business. The proceeds were to be paid
into the court's registry. On August 7, 1964, King Furniture filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy, and the proceeds from the sale of the merchandise
were transferred to the trustee in bankruptcy. The referee in bankruptcy entered an order denying the petitioner a lien on the proceeds.
On petition to review, the district court affirmed the referee's order
that the petitioner's lien could not be given priority under the Bankruptcy
Act. It held, inter alia, that since Arkansas law construed the lien created by
the lease as one created by contract, the lien was subject to the applicable
provisions of the Arkansas Uniform Commercial Code. The court then held
that the lien created by the lease was not a "landlord's lien" within the meaning of Section 9-104(b) and therefore was not excluded from the operation of
the Code. The court reasoned: first, that to permit a lien created by a contract
between landlord and tenant to qualify for exclusion from the Code as a "landlord's lien" would restrict greatly the benefits which the Code was meant to
obtain; and second, that a "landlord's lien" as used in Section 9-104(b)
refers only to a landlord's lien created by statute.
After determining that the Code was applicable, the court held that the
petitioner had not met the Code's filing requirements. It rejected the petitioner's contention, that the recording of his memorandum lease pursuant to
the realty recording statute was sufficient, on the ground that Section 1-104
of the Arkansas Code had impliedly repealed this statute as to the recording
for goods and chattels. The petitioner also contended that his memorandum
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lease met the formal requirements of a financing statement; that he had filed
the lease in the real estate records; that all persons were deemed to have
knowledge of the lease's contents since it had been filed in the real estate
records; and that consequently he should prevail under Section 9-401(2)
of the Code. The court rejected this contention on the grounds that filing in
the real estate records was not notice as to personalty and that under Section
1-201(25), "knowledge," as used in Section 9-401(2), means actual knowledge.
COMMENT

In limiting the term "landlord's lien" to a statutory landlord lien, the
court in the present case is at variance with at least two Pennsylvania decisions. In In re Einhorn Bros., Inc., 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959) and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dutton, 205 Pa. Super. 506, 205 A.2d 656 (1964),
the landlord, pursuant to his common law right of distress, had levied a distraint for rent against personalty already subject to a perfected security interest under the Code. In each case, the court allowed the landlord to prevail.
Even though Pennsylvania does not have a statute granting a landlord's lien
for rent, the courts held that the Code did not apply because Section 9-104(b)
excludes a landlord's lien from the operation of Article 9. Compare Comment,
65 W. Va. L. Rev. 40 (1962).
R.G.K.
SECTION' 9-206. Agreement Not to Assert Defenses Against
Assignee; Modification of Sales Warranties
Where Security Agreement Exists
B. W. ACCEPTANCE CORP. V. RICHMOND

259 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
In September, 1961, the defendant executed two conditional sales contracts concerning certain laundry equipment in favor of Massachusetts Laundry. Under the contracts, the, defendant promised not to assert against any
assignee of Massachusetts Laundry "any defense, counterclaim, or offset on
account of breach of warranty or otherwise in any action for the purchase
price or for possession" brought by the assignee. The contracts also identified
the plaintiff as Massachusetts Laundry's factor, contained assignment and
endorsement provisions and provided that the instruments embodied the
entire agreement between the parties. Massachusetts Laundry then assigned
the contracts to the plaintiff who, in October 1964, brought suit on the contracts. The defendant raised defenses of breach of warranty and failure of
consideration. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment.
In granting the plaintiff's motion, the court held, inter alio, that under
previous case law the clause whereby the defendant had promised not to
assert against an assignee of the seller any defense which it might have had
against the seller was enforceable against the defendant. Comparatively, the
court noted that Section 9-206 of the Code, which was not in effect at the
time of the transaction in the instant case, indicates that the same policy
would be applied to subsequent transactions of this type.
R.G.K.
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FIRST NAT'L BANK V. RUSTED
205 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. 1965)

The defendant entered into a retail installment contract with Reed Motors for the purchase of a used car. According to the terms of the contract,
the defendant acknowledged "delivery, examination and acceptance of said
car in its present condition." The reverse side of the contract contained a
warrant of attorney, a confession clause and a dealer's assignment which
provided that the buyer would settle all his claims with the seller and not
set them up as defenses to any action brought by the assignee. Pursuant to
this assignment clause, the contract was assigned to the plaintiff. The defendant claimed that the car subsequently became inoperative and that he returned it to the seller, who promised to repair it. When the seller failed to do
so, the defendant discontinued payments to the plaintiff. The car was finally
sold by either Reed Motors or the plaintiff.
In a motion to reopen a judgment confessed against him in favor of the
plaintiff, the defendant, among his other contentions, alleged that the defenses
of failure of consideration and subsequent promise and failure to repair were
available to him and that he had purchased the car upon implied warranty
that the car was in good working condition.
The appellate court, in affirming the lower court's denial of the defendant's motion, held that, by the terms of the retail installment contract, the
defendant had waived his defenses of failure of consideration and subsequent
promise and failure to repair as against the plaintiff according to Section
9-206(1) of the Code. The court was satisfied that the plaintiff had taken
his assignment for value, in good faith, and without notice of a claim or
defense. The only defenses which could not be so waived were those enumerated in Sections 3-305(2) and 9-206(2). The defendant's remaining defense
of breach of implied warranty was not a Section 3-305(2) defense, but did
come within the defenses of Section 9-206(2). In accordance with the latter
subsection the court referred to Article 2 to hold that the defense of breach
of implied warranty was not available to the defendant since he had purchased
the car "in its present condition." These words were similar to "as is" and
"with all faults," the terms used in Section 2-316 to preclude all implied
warranties. Furthermore, implied warranties were precluded by the fact that
the defendant had acknowledged examination of the car.
COMMENT
(1). The court did not cite Section 2-316(3) (b), under which examination of goods precludes implied warranties. This subsection, however, does not
preclude all implied warranties, only those "with regard to defects which an
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him."
(2). The court erred in bolding that "a buyer may contractually waive,
as against an assignee, any defenses except those enumerated in Sections
3-305(2) and 9-206(2)." Section 9-206(1) is explicit: when the buyer agrees
not to assert defenses against the seller's assignee and an assignee subsequently takes for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense, the assignee can enforce the buyer's agreement and the buyer can raise
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against the assignee only Section 3-305(2) defenses (those available against
a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument). Thus the only defenses a
buyer cannot waive by a Section 9-206(1) agreement are Section 3-305(2)
defenses.
What the court might have meant by its holding is that a simple agreement by a buyer not to assert defenses against the seller's assignee is insufficient to waive defenses based on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Specifically, it may have reasoned (1) that such an agreement
by the buyer is a disclaimer of the seller's warranties as to the assignee and
that Section 9-206(2) refers to any disclaimer of the seller's warranties; (2)
that consequently, under Section 9-206(2), the question of whether the
buyer's agreement not to assert was an effective disclaimer of the seller's
warranties as to the assignee was governed by Article 2; (3) that under
Section 2-316(2) a disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability, to
be effective, had to mention merchantability; and (4) that the simple agreement, therefore, by the buyer not to assert defenses against the assignee was
insufficient to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability. This would
also explain why the court then proceeded to Section 2-316(3)(a), under
which the language "in its present condition" was sufficient to disclaim all
implied warranties.
While this position appears logical, it can be maintained only by disregarding the explicit language of Section 9-206(1). Moreover, it misses the
purpose behind Section 9-206(2) which was intended to cover the situation in
which the seller retains a purchase money security interest in the goods and
attempts to disclaim his warranties. As Comment 3 to Section 9-206 points
out, subsection (2) simply states that in this situation "purchase money
security transactions are sales .. . , warranty rules for sales are applicable," and the seller may disclaim his warranties only to "the extent permitted by Article 2." Thus Section 9-206(2) makes specific reference to a
seller's disclaimer of warranties as to himself, not as to his assignee.
W .M.
SECTION 9-301. Persons Who Take Priority Over Unperfected
Security Interests; "Lien Creditor"
IN THE MATTER OF MERKEL, INC.

258 N.Y.S.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
On November 29, 1961, Monarch Marking System Company (Monarch)
leased certain machinery to Merkel, Inc. The lease, which was not recorded,
contained an option giving Merkel the right to purchase the machinery at the
end of the rental period. Sometime after the effective date of the Uniform
Commercial Code in New York, Merkel assigned the machines to an assignee
for the benefit of creditors who had no notice of the transaction between
Monarch and Merkel. Monarch then brought this action for an order directing the assignee to turn over and deliver the machinery. The court held for
the assignee for the benefit of creditors.
Relying upon Section 10-102 of the New York Code, the court first decided that the agreement between Monarch and Merkel was a "conditional
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS

sale" under pre-Code law and "in law a 'security interest' within the purview
of Section 1-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code." Since Monarch had not
recorded the lease agreement as required by pre-Code law, the court concluded
that the lease was in law an unperfected security interest. The assignee for
the benefit of creditors, on the other hand, was a lien creditor under Section
9-301(3). Under Section 9-301(1) (b), therefore, the assignee who took the
machinery without knowledge of Monarch's unperfected security interest, had
the superior interest in the machinery.
COMMENT

See the comment to In the Matter of Merkel, Inc., annotated infra.
S.L.B.
IN THE MATTER OF MERKEL, INC.
259 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
The petitioner Tipper leased to Merkel, Inc. twelve machines pursuant
to a lease agreement which was not recorded. Subsequently, the machines were
assigned by Merkel to an assignee for the benefit of creditors. The plaintiff
sought to compel the assignee to relinquish the machines. The assignee contended that the lease agreement was in effect a conditional sale which was
ineffective against him since it had not been recorded. Furthermore, he argued
that Section 9-301 of the Code "includes an assignee for the benefit of creditors
from the time of assignment" as a "lien creditor." The court held for the
plaintiff on the ground that the agreement between Merkel and the petitioner
was not a conditional sale but a lease which did not have to he recorded.
The court further stated that even if the agreement were construed as a
conditional sale, a filing required by Section 65 of the Personal Property Law
was still unnecessary. The purpose of this section was to protect innocent
purchasers and creditors of the vendee. The assignee for the benefit of creditors fell into neither category, but stood in the shoes of the buyer, Merkel.
The court then dismissed the assignee's Code argument stating that the Code
did not apply to transactions occurring before September 27, 1964, "with exceptions here not applicable."
COMMENT

See In the Matter of Merkel, Inc., annotated supra.
The decisions of both Merkel cases can be reconciled on a factual difference. In the first case, the lease agreement was held to be a conditional
sales agreement; in the second, it was held to be a lease. There is, however,
an inconsistency in the two court opinions concerning the application of
the New York Code to each case.
Both cases present a situation where the original transaction was entered
into before the Code became effective in New York while the assignee for the
benefit of creditors was appointed after the effective date of the Code. It was
the decision of the first Merkel court that the lessor, since he had not recorded the lease agreement under pre-Code law, retained in law only an
"unperfected security interest." The assignee, on the other hand, attained
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the status of a "lien creditor" under the Code. Section 9-301. Under Section
9-301(1) (b), therefore, the assignee had priority over the lessor.
The court in the second Merkel case, in its dictum, stated that pre-Code
law should determine the assignee's status as well as that of the lessor. Relying on Section 10-102, it reasoned that since the lease agreement was entered
into before the effective date of the Code, any event affecting the property
involved must be governed by pre-Code law. For another court adopting this
interpretation, see First Nat'l Bank v. Bahan, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 429, 109
N.E.2d 272 (C.P. 1964), annot. 6 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 105 (1964).
It is submitted that the interpretation of the first Merkel court is correct. First, Section 10-102(2) of the Code begins:
Transactions validly entered into before the effective date . . . of
this Act and the rights, duties and interests flowing from them remain valid thereafter and may be terminated, completed, consumated
or enforced as required or permitted by any statute or other law
repealed or modified by this Act as though such repeal or modification had not occurred . .
Section 10-101, however, provides that the Code controls all transactions and
events occurring after the effective date of the Code. While the lease agreement was a transaction entered into before the effective date of the Code,
the appointment of the assignee was an event occurring after such date.
Section 9-301 provides that an assignee for the benefit of creditors is a lien
creditor "from the time of [his] appointment."
Secondly, the New York adoption of Section 10-102(2), as it read at the
dates of these two cases, seems to have required such a result. Section 10102(2) added to the Official Code the requirement that any "security interest as defined in this Act (Section 1-201) and however denominated in
any law repealed by this Act" would remain perfected under the Code for a
stated period if it were "perfected" under pre-Code law. This provision is
giving cognizance to the fact that the Code will control an event occurring
after its effective date. It appears that the court in the first Merkel case
looked upon Section 10-102 similarly, for it decided that the lease agreement
was a "security interest" within the meaning of Section 1-201(37). For this
reason it decided that the agreement was an "unperfected security interest"
since it had not been "perfected" under pre-Code law.
Finally, the present enactment of Section 10-102 of the New York Code
(amended July 16, 1965) would call for a result similar to that of the first
Merkel case. Section 10-102 (3) (c) states in part: "A security interest, however denominated in any law repealed or modified by this Act, which was not
perfected when this Act takes effect but which could have been perfected
before this Act takes effect ... and which if this Act applied, could be perfected ... may be perfected . . . in accordance with this Act." It seems that
the legislature realized that a "security interest" which was not "perfected"
under pre-Code law would remain "unperfected" under the Code with the
result that the priority rules of the Code would govern the disposition of the
property involved.
S.L.B.
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AL MAROONE FORD, INC. V. MANHEIM AUTO AUCTION, INC.

208 A.2d 290 (Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-201, supra.
SECTION 9-302. When Filing Is Required to Perfect Security
Interest; Security Interests to Which Filing
Provisions of This Article Do Not Apply
COMMONWEALTH LOAN CO, V. BERRY

207 N.E.2d 545 (Ohio 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-310, infra.
IN THE MATTER OF WHEATLAND ELEC. PROD. CO .
237 F. Supp. 820 ( W.D. Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-201, supra.

SECTION 9-307. Protection of Buyers of Goods
AL MAROONE FORD, INC. V. MANHEIM AUTO AUCTION, INC.

207 A.2d 290 (Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-201, supra.
SECTION 9-310. Priority of Certain Liens Arising
by Operation of Law
COMMONWEALTH LOAN CO, V. BERRY

207 N.E.2d 545 (Ohio 1965)
Defendant garage repaired an automobile on which the plaintiff held a
chattel mortgage which was properly noted on the certificate of title. When
the owner of the car failed to pay for the repairs, the defendant claimed the
right to retain the car by virtue of a garageman's lien. The plaintiff brought
this action to replevin the car.
The trial court and the court of appeals found for the plaintiff. The
supreme court affirmed, holding that under Section 4504.13 of the Ohio Revised Code, a lien noted on a certificate of title of a motor vehicle is valid
against other liens. The court noted that there is an apparent conflict between
the priority granted under Section 9-310 of the Code (Section 1309.29 of
the Ohio Revised Code), which provides that an artisan's lien "takes priority
over a perfected security interest," and the priority granted under Section
4505.13. The court reasoned that since Section 4505.13 was specifically designed to cover motor vehicle liens and since the legislature had expressly
excluded motor vehicles from the filing requirements of Section 9-302 of the
Code (Section 1309.21 of the Ohio Revised Code) and had expressly eliminated motor vehicles from Section 1333.41 of the Ohio Revised Code, the
Ohio lien law, Section 4505.13 prevails over the general provisions of Section
9-310 of the Code.
COMMENT

It appears that the confusion in the present case was generated by the
failure of the Ohio Legislature to amend Section 9-310 of the Ohio Code so
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that a garageman's lien on a motor vehicle would have been expressly excluded from it.
W.L.M.
SCHLEIMER V. ARROWHEAD GARAGE, INC.

260 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Civ. Ct. 1965)
The plaintiff was the assignee of a retail installment contract executed
pursuant to the sale of an automobile. On September 28, 1964, while the
vendee of the auto was in default, the auto was brought to the defendant's
garage for repairs. When no one returned to recover the auto, the defendant
foreclosed his mechanic's lien. On receiving notice of the foreclosure, the
plaintiff demanded the automobile. The defendant did not comply, and the
plaintiff brought an action for conversion. The court held that the defendant's Hen had priority over the plaintiff's interest and ordered judgment in
favor of the defendant for the amount of the repairs.
The court grounded its holding upon prior deCisions in New York which
had held that a repairman's lien had priority over the interest of a conditional vendor and that such priority was not defeated because the conditional
vendee had defaulted in payment. The court was also of the opinion that since
the auto had been brought to the defendant's garage on September 28, 1964,
the day after the Code became effective in New York, Section 9-310, under
which the defendant also prevailed, should apply.
COMMENT

The court concluded its discussion of the applicability of the Code with
the statement: "In any event, Motor Discount Corp. v. Scappy & Pick .. .
[12 N.Y.2d 227, 238 N.Y.S.2d 670, 188 N.E.2d 907 (1963)], is the controlling law whether the Uniform Commercial Code applies or not." The
Code, however, did apply, and it was the controlling law.
Section 10-101 of the New York Code provides that the Code applies
to all transactions and events occurring after September 27, 1964. On September 28, 1964, the defendant received the automobile. When he repaired
the auto without being compensated, he had "a lien upon such motor vehicle."
N.Y. Lien Law § 184. Under Section 9-310, this took priority over the plaintiff's interest. See Section 9-310, Comment 1. Contra First Nat'l Bank v.
Bahan, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 429, 198 N.E.2d 272 (C.P. 1964), annot. 6 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 105 (1964).
For the applicability of the Code in determining priority between a preCode security and a lien accruing after the Code has become effective, see
In the Matter of Merkel, Inc., 258 N.Y.S.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1965), annotated
under Section 9-301, supra.
R.J.D.
SECTION 9-401. Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing; Removal
of Collateral
IN RE KING FURNITURE CITY, INC.

240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-104, supra.
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SECTION 9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing Statement;
Amendments

IN THE MATTER OF EXCEL STORES, INC.
341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965)
Excel Stores, Inc. entered into a conditional sales contract with the plaintiff for the purchase of six cash registers. The treasurer of Excel Stores, however, mistakenly signed the contract "Excel Department Stores" instead of
"Excel Stores, Inc." The contract was then properly filed. Subsequently, the
store went into bankruptcy, and the plaintiff brought a petition for reclamation of the cash registers. The district court denied the petition on the ground
that there was not sufficient compliance with Section 9-402 of the Connecticut
Code because the conditional sales contract had not been properly signed. In
reversing, the court of appeals held that the error was merely a "minor one,"
which was "not seriously misleading," and thus permissible under Section
9-402(5).
The court also noted that despite the defective signature, under Section
1-201(39) the parties entered into a valid and binding contract since they
clearly intended to execute a contract.
W.L.M.
IN THE MATTER OF MUTUAL BD. & PACKAGING CORP.
342 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-403, infra.
SECTION 9-403. What Constitutes Filing; Duration of Filing;
Effect of Lapsed Filing; Duties of Filing Officer

IN THE MATTER OF MUTUAL BD. & PACKAGING CORP.
342 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965)
The plaintiff sold a gluing machine to Mutual Board Corp. under a conditional sales contract. In order to record this contract, the plaintiff, on
June 20, 1962, sent the contract and a check to cover the filing fee to the
county clerk in the county in which Mutual Board Corp. was located. The
clerk received the contract and check on or about June 21, 1962, but would
not accept the contract for filing because the plaintiff had failed to have a
notarial certificate attached to the contract. He thus returned the contract
to the plaintiff which obtained the notarial certificate. On June 29, 1962,
the plaintiff's conditional sales contract was finally accepted for filing. In
the meantime, Mutual Board Corp. executed a chattel mortgage on the same
machine in favor of the defendant which recorded the mortgage on June 25,
1962. Subsequently, Mutual Board Corp. was adjudged bankrupt. The plaintiff brought a reclamation proceeding in the bankruptcy court to recover the
proceeds from the sale of the machine. The defendant, in turn, claimed the
sum by virtue of its chattel mortgage. The referee and the district court
held that the defendant had priority since its instrument had been accepted
for filing before the plaintiff's.
121
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In vacating the trial court's judgment and remanding for further proceedings, the court of appeals held that presentation of the conditional sales
contract together with the filing fee constituted filing for priority purposes.
While the Uniform Commercial Code was not in effect at the time of the
present transaction, the court, in its third footnote cited Section 9-403(1) as
consistent with its holding.
Less importantly, the court in its first footnote cited Section 9-402 in
connection with the proposition that there is no requirement that the contract
had to contain an acknowledgment, attestation or a notarial certificate to be
filed.
R.G.K.

ARTICLE 10: EFFECTIVE DATE AND REPEALER
SECTION 10-102. Specific Repealer; Provision of Transition
IN THE MATTER OF MERKEL, INC.
258 N.Y.S.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1965)

Annotated under Section 9-301, supra.

•
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